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CITS Special Report: The Development of Mexican Nonproliferation Export 
Controls - Dr. Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado1 
December 2004 
I: Introduction 
The dawning of the 21st century has been remarkable because of the rapid evolution of 
international security affairs in the wake of the 9/11 attack on the United States. This 
evolution has caused a tectonic shift in international priorities and policy of the reigning 
global hegemon, the United States that for many has been the cause of much confusion 
and consternation. Joseph Tulchin remarks, “One of the most disquieting features of the 
post-cold war global community has been the confusion surrounding discussions of 
security – national security and international security – so that the very definition of the 
term is unclear.”2 Recent shifts in U.S. security policy under the Bush Administration has 
only served to further muddy the waters as to what exactly constitutes the varying 
degrees and dimensions of security policy in both its national and international forms. 
Moreover, for a state such as Mexico this lack of clarity serves to make the task of 
formulating and implementing relevant security policy all the more difficult, as it 
attempts to chart what it believes is a globally responsive course toward the development 
of a nonproliferation export control policy. This CITS report looks at three specific areas 
to address the extent to which these policy developments meet the overriding 
international scope and objectives, as well as the domestic needs of a cogent 
nonproliferation export control policy, and their importance to the United States.  First, 
the report briefly assesses the current state of Mexican security policy, including issues 
and concerns relevant to current global and regional environment. Secondly, the report 
details Mexico’s participation in international nonproliferation and export control 
agreements and arrangements. Third, the report discusses the development of the legal 
and institutional basis of Mexican governmental efforts to create nonproliferation and 
                                                 
1 Dr. Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado is a CITS Senior Research Associate, Associate Professor of Political 
Science and the Assistant Director of the Office of Latino/Latin American Studies at the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha. The author would like to thank Juventino Olivera Kapellmann and the entire staff of 
Mexico’s Sub-secretariat of Industry and Trade of the Secretariat of the Economy for their assistance in 
obtaining the information used for this report.  
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export control mechanisms that meet international standards. Finally, the report 
concludes with a brief discussion of future nonproliferation export control challenges and 
opportunities for Mexico and offers a set of preliminary recommendations that will assist 
Mexico in more closely aligning the implementation of export control measures to 
broader multilateral export control objectives.  
II: The Current Status of Mexican Security Policy 
Until 2000, Mexico possessed a rather insular weltanschauung (worldview) that was 
caused by the ruling PRI’s (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) almost singular focus 
on domestic political control. Mexico did not actively engage in any strategic alliances 
and the main emphasis of Mexico’s national security and defense policies have been 
overtly defensive and nationalistic.3 As a consequence of the ending of the Cold War, and 
the dawn what has been termed the global “War on Terrorism,”4  Mexico like many other 
countries has now begun to focus on new national security concerns, such as migration, 
border security, drug trafficking and organized crime. This has prompted a renewed focus 
on the debate over regionalization and the updating of security arrangements to 
incorporate these new security challenges in addition to the pre-existing challenges. For 
Mexico this has prompted attention beyond the macro-economic effects of 
democratization and free trade in the security environment. Mexico while long an ardent 
supporter of global and regional nonproliferation and export control arrangements faces 
significant impediments from the perspective of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the control over the export of materials and technology that contribute to 
the proliferation of WMD technologies. Mexican national security and defense structures, 
the institutions and legislation written in the context of the Mexican Revolution, have 
                                                 
3 Raul Benitez-Manaut, “Mexico’s Security Dilemma,” in Mexico and the New Challenges of Hemispheric 
Security, Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas, No. 11 (2004), p. 51. 
4One could argue that the public needs more of an education in the complexities of international terrorism, 
and fewer of the oversimplifications that have characterized the current blame game, and the subsequent 
reliance on “overwhelming force” to address the perception of failure in addressing this issue. See John 
Orme, “The Utility of Force in a World of Scarcity,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Winter 1997-
1998), pp. 138-167; and Paul R. Pillar, “A Scapegoat Is Not a Solution”, The New York Times, June 4, 
2004. 
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remained relatively untouched since the early 1920s. Mexico purposefully sought to, 
“maintain political stability in the short run” so that, “the implementation of reforms in 
security and defense is sacrificed in the long term.”5 The primary dilemma for Mexico 
now is whether the present legal basis is sufficient and appropriate for the challenges of 
defense and security matters, general, and nonproliferation policy and export controls, in 
particular; and how these reforms can be made while at the same time maintaining 
stability in Mexico’s new democratic context.6  
III. Mexico’s Participation in International Nonproliferation Agreements and 
Arrangements 
Dating back to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, Mexico has been the among 
most ardent supporters in Latin America of the nonproliferation of WMD. It was 
instrumental in the negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the formation of Latin 
America as a nuclear weapon free zone through the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Arms in Latin America (OPANAL).7 Moreover, it has served as a key Latin 
American diplomatic link for the expansion of other nonproliferation regimes up until the 
present. Recently, Mexican officials have used that role to elucidate what it and other 
non-nuclear weapon states view as necessary reforms to the global nonproliferation effort 
if it is to remain relevant. At an international nonproliferation meeting in Moscow in 
2003, Alejandro Estivill, Mexico’s Vice Minister in Charge of Foreign Relations stated 
that, “the international community has wasted time and energy talking about reform 
focused only on the “who” of the membership. But we should concentrate on “how” 
                                                 
5 Raul Benitez-Manaut, “Mexico’s Security Dilemma,” in Mexico and the New Challenges of Hemispheric 
Security, Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas, No. 11 (2004), p. 54. 
 
6 See Dorothy J. Solinger, “Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan and Mexico,” Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 12, No. 1 (2001) pp. 30-42. 
7 For an overview of Mexico’s role see, “Statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan - 30th 
Anniversary of the Signing of the Tlatelolco Treaty.” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 13, February - 
March 1997  
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multilaterism works, its mechanisms…we have an opportunity to start a deliberation on 
that reform.”8 It is a direct challenge to the standing global order to enhance a number of 
nonproliferation measures including: transparency, irreversibility, verification, treaties of 
fissile materials and export controls, with specific concentration on secure flows of data, 
security measures and physical protection. From the Mexican perspective, the idea is to 
produce a series of binding instruments to substitute empty political declarations in a 
binding nonproliferation regime.9 Consistent with that perspective on multilateral 
nonproliferation, Mexico is party to all major WMD nonproliferation agreements and 
actively participates in the administration bodies of those arrangements (See Table 1). 
Table 1: Mexico’s Participation in International Nonproliferation Agreements 
Agreement Member Signed Ratified Accession or 
succesion 
NPT/IAEA Yes 7/26/68 1/21/69* ** 
CWC/OPCW Yes 1/13/93 8/29/94 - 
BWC/OBCW Yes Yes  Yes - 
Treaty of 
Tlateloco/OPANAL 
Yes 2/14/67 April 69 - 
Australia Group No - - - 
Wassenaar 
Arrangement 
No - - - 
Nuclear Suppliers 
Group 
No - - - 
MTCR No - - - 
Source: Author, * with Statement; ** Non-NPT full safeguards agreement in force 
Conversely, Mexico is a notable absence in nonproliferation export control arrangements. 
This is a signifacant weakness of Mexico’s broader national security policy inasmuch as 
export control instruments such as the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement 
have been established in order to contribute to regional and international security and 
stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of 
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing 
                                                 
8 Alejandro Estivill, “The Perspective of Mexico and Latin America on the NPT: The Growing Role of 
Intermediate Industrialized Countries in the Non-proliferation Process.” Presented at the Carnegie Moscow 
Nonproliferation Conference, September 22, 2003, Moscow Russia. 
9 Ibid. 
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stockpiles.  While initially intended for western states, states such as Mexico because of 
their expanding international trade should seek, through its national policies, to ensure 
that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of 
military or paramilitary (terrorist) capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not 
diverted to support such capabilities.  
IV. The Development of the Legal and Institutional Basis for Mexican 
Nonproliferation Export Controls. 
Beginning in 2001, perhaps as a response to the rapidly shifting context of global 
security, and specifically to the push by the Bush Administration to single out states 
whose “rogue” behavior – that is, states conducting activities in direct contradiction to 
global nonproliferation norms and standard – invited suspicion or uncertainty, Mexico 
embarked on an aggressive program of legislation and policy implementation to establish 
export control lists, policies and protocols specifically directed at nonproliferation-related 
materials and technologies. From late 2001 until 2004, Mexico has introduced 15 pieces 
of legislation (See Appendix) covering the export, control, storage and management of 
nuclear, chemical and biological materials. This effort has incorporated officials from no 
less than seven Mexican government ministries led by the Secretariat of the Economy 
(See Figure 1). More importantly, the coordination of national security policy in toto, 
which includes nonproliferation export control, has been placed under the auspices of the 
Inter-ministerial Commission on Disarmament, Terrorism, and International Security 
Affairs formed in 2004. This is an important development because it has been specifically 
implemented to help Mexico to meet the myriad of national policy instruments required 
by its commitments to international multilateral agreements. As previously mentioned, 
this was not the priority of Mexican national security and it will be interesting to see the 
extent to which this new emphasis of a wider global perspective on national security is 
maintained after the 2006 presidential elections, especially if the PRI can retake Los 
Pinos, the Mexican presidential residence.  It should be noted that this effort has been 
consciously undertaken by Mexico to address this shortcoming and reflects an on-going 
commitment by Mexican government officials to enhance its response to its bilateral, 
international and multilateral obligations, as well as instability in the global 
environment.10 
Figure 1: Mexico’s Inter-ministerial Commission on Disarmament, Terrorism, and 
International Security Affairs as of 8/13/04 (number of members in 
                                                 
10 Interview with Juventino Olivera Kapellmann, Sub-Secretariat of Industry and Trade, Mexican 
Secretariat of Economy, June 6,  2004, Mexico City, Mexico. 
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parenthesis).
 
Source: Author (2004) 
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nonproliferation export control is clearly in a state of transition with the primary 
challenge being Mexico’s ability to provide an institutional and legal basis sufficient and 
appropriate to the challenges of export control reform.  Mexico has been a de facto Latin 
American leader in the promotion of nonproliferation at the diplomatic level. Its critique 
to the nonproliferation regime is that it has been prone to issuing what it terms, empty 
political declarations, while doing little in enhance cooperation, assistance and 
transparency. Mexico for its part must similarly embrace reform of its national export 
control system. This is a notable weakness of Mexico’s broader national security policy 
inasmuch as multilateral export control instruments have been established and function in 
order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting 
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of proliferation, conventional arms 
and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations and 
diversions. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility 
of each sovereign state.  All measures with respect to those responsibilities are taken in 
accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of 
national discretion.  Therefore, the responsibility falls directly on the state. In the case of 
Mexico the development of the legal and institutional basis for Mexican nonproliferation 
export controls has assumed a priority status among national security priorities. More 
importantly, this new priority has been placed under the auspices of the Inter-ministerial 
Commission on Disarmament, Terrorism, and International Security Affairs formed in 
2004. As previously mentioned, this is an important development because it has been 
specifically implemented to help Mexico to meet the myriad of national policy 
instruments required by its commitments to international multilateral agreements. 
Moreover, these developments are important to the United States for a number of 
reasons. First, U.S. exports of nuclear reactor materials, fuel elements and machine 
isotope separators exceeded $45 million for the period of 1997 to 2003, increasing trade 
in this area by over 500 percent during that period. There has been a similar increase in 
the export of chemicals and related products with little is if any concern on the part of 
U.S. or Mexican officials over the loss, theft or diversion of such materials.11 Within the 
context of the integrity of border security, control measures over the flow of migration, 
                                                 
11 Figures obtains from Trade States Express™ database (http//tse.export.gov) 
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and drugs, must be placed alongside the control over WMD materials inasmuch as policy 
analysts have consistently warned against the threat of a domestic WMD attack against 
the United States. There has been little if any bilateral discussion over such matters, and 
almost no discussion or cooperation whatsoever in the area of export control. This is 
derived in part from the historical insistence by Mexican officials that discussion of 
“sovereign issues” with the United States constituted interference in Mexican national 
affairs.  
Yet there is significant space in which these discussions can and should be taken into 
consideration collectively, if not at the bilateral level then perhaps through multilateral 
instruments as they pertain to regional and national security and nonproliferation 
imperatives. These discussions can be framed in the following recommendations: 
• Mexico should continue working to develop its national export control legislation 
and institutions as a part of both national and regional security imperative;  
• Because of the complex global political and economic environment, Mexico 
should seek to incorporate its national effort in developing a export control system 
into multilateral export control arrangements, especially as its international trade 
continues to expand and it comes into contact with a larger number of states (both 
importers and exporters); 
• The United States (government, research and academic institutions) should 
engage Mexican officials working in the national export control system to offer 
assistance and promote harmonization to the fullest extent possible as the system 
continues to develop. 
These are important matters because export controls do matter. They are a link 
between trade and security, and they are effective when national systems are 
harmonized. Because of proximity, history, NAFTA and the FTAA, Mexico and the 
United States have little choice but to address these issues as they are too important to 
the long-term economic and security interests of these neighboring states to be 
neglected any further.  
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Appendix I: Major Mexican Export Control Legislation12 
1. – AGREEMENT of March 25, 2002 that the classification establishes and codification 
of merchandise whose import is subject to regulation on the part of the dependencies that 
integrate the Inter-secretarial Commission for the Control of the Process and Use of 
Plaguicides, Fertilizers and Toxic Substances. (DOF 29-03-2002).  
2. - AGREEMENT of March 26, 2002 that identifies the tariff categories of the Law of 
the General Taxes and Tariffs of Import and Export, in which the merchandise are 
classified whose import is subject to the payment of compensatory quotas.  
3. - AGREEMENT of March 29, 2002 that the classification establishes and codification 
of merchandise whose import and export are subject to the requirement of previous 
permission on the part of the Secretariat of Economy.  
4. - AGREEMENT of April 1, 2002 that the classification establishes and codification of 
the essential chemical agents whose import or export is subject upon presentment of a 
previous warning before the Secretariat of Health.  
5. - AGREEMENT of January 5, 2004 that reforms and adds the similar that identifies 
the tariff categories of the Law of the General Taxes and Tariffs of Import and of Export 
in which the subject merchandise to the fulfillment of the Mexican official norms from 
the point from their entrance to the country are classified, and in the one of its exit. (DOF 
05-01-04).  
6. – AGREEMENT of June 8, 2002 that reforms and adds the similar that identifies the 
tariff categories of the Law of the General Taxes and Tariffs of Import and of Export in 
which the subject merchandise to the fulfillment of the Mexican official norms in the 
point from their entrance to the country are classified, and in the one of its exit. (DOF 08-
06-02).  
7. – AGREEMENT of July 11, 2003 that reforms and adds the similar that identifies the 
tariff categories of the Law of the General Taxes and Tariffs of Import and of Export in 
which the subject merchandise to the fulfillment of the Mexican official norms in the 
point from their entrance to the country are classified, and in the one of its exit. (DOF 11-
07-03).  
8. - AGREEMENT of April 15, 2004 that reforms and adds the similar that identifies the 
tariff categories of the Law of the General Taxes and Tariffs of Import and of Export in 
which the subject merchandise to the fulfillment of the Mexican official norms in the 
point from their entrance to the country are classified, and in the one of its exit. (DOF 15-
04-04).  
9. – AGREEMENT of March 27, 2002 that identifies the tariff categories of the Law of 
the General Taxes and Tariffs of Import and of Export in which the subject merchandise 
to the fulfillment of the Mexican official norms in the point from their entrance to the 
country are classified, and in the one of its exit. (DOF 27-03-02).  
10. - AGREEMENT of March 29, 2002 that establish the classification and codification 
of merchandise and products whose import, export, internment or exit are subject to 
sanitary regulation on the part of the Secretariat of Health (DOF 29-03-2002).  
                                                 
12 All of these agreements are between the Secretary of the Economy and other Mexican government 
ministries.  
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11. - AGREEMENT of August 29, 2003 that reforms and adds the similar that the 
classification establishes and codification of the merchandise whose import or export is 
subject to regulation on the part of the Secretariat of the National Defense (DOF 29-08-
2003). 
 12. – AGREEMENT of December 30, 2003 that modifies to the similar that the 
classification establishes and codification of merchandise whose import and export are 
subject to regulation on the part of the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources 
(DOF 30-12-2003). 
 13. - AGREEMENT of March 29, 2002 that the classification establishes and 
codification of merchandise whose import and export are subject to regulation on the part 
of the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (DOF 29-03-2002). 
14. - AGREEMENT of August 13, 2003 that the classification establishes and 
codification of the merchandise whose import or export is subject to regulation on the 
part of the Secretariat of the National Defense (DOF 25-XI-2002).  
15. - AGREEMENT of November 25, 2002 that the classification establishes and 
codification of merchandise whose import and export are subject to previous 
authorization on the part of the Secretariat of Energy (28-III-2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
